The Events that Preceded the Yom Kippur War
Anwar Sadat assumed power in Egypt in 1970 and made it clear he was resolved to retrieve the Sinai Peninsula from Israel. In June 1973, during a late-night meeting with President Nixon, Soviet leader Brezhnev issued a warning: If Israel did not accept Egypt’s proposal to withdraw from Sinai in exchange for a non-belligerency treaty, there would be a war.

In the subsequent months, there were growing indications of the possibility of war, yet the Israeli army remained unconcerned. Convinced of its own superiority, it did not believe that Egypt or Syria would initiate a war. General Eli Zeira, Israel’s Chief of Intelligence, was a leading advocate of this view. Zeira championed the view that the Arabs would not wage war against Israel until they had achieved strategic parity, which they had not. By September 1973, there were clear signs the Egyptians and Syrians were preparing for something significant. Despite the signs of a buildup, the Army remained confident that war was unlikely.

On the evening of September 24, 1973, King Hussein of Jordan made a covert visit to meet Prime Minister Golda Meir. At the meeting, he warned that Egypt and Syria were planning a joint attack. Despite the warning, the Army, led by the intelligence division, continued to believe the chance of war was low. This belief persisted despite a massive buildup of forces by both Egypt and Syria, which army intelligence interpreted as merely preparatory drills. On the northern front, the Syrian army was making all the preparations necessary for a war, and the commanders were nervous. Nonetheless, they remained skeptical that Syria would attack alone and were partially reassured by assessments suggesting that Egypt would not initiate an attack.

As increasing reports began arriving that confirmed the possibility of an attack, the army started to rethink its initial analysis. On Friday, October 5, the eve of Yom Kippur, a special cabinet meeting was convened to discuss the possibility of war. Despite mounting evidence that war was likely, Zeira held firm that a war would not take place. IDF Chief of Staff Elazar responded by raising the army's alert status to one level below full war readiness. That same night, the head of the Mossad met with the agency's most reliable source in Egypt, who explicitly warned him that war would erupt the following day. By the early morning hours, the army had received confirmation that war would indeed commence the next day.

On the west bank of the Suez Canal, Egypt had amassed five divisions, 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks, and 2,000 artillery pieces. In contrast, the Israeli defense along a hundred-mile stretch comprised only 450 men. Across all of Sinai, Israel had 290 tanks and 44 artillery pieces. The situation was even more dire on the Golan Heights, facing the Syrians.

Within a few hours, the Yom Kippur war would begin.

The Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War
As dawn broke on October 6th, fresh intelligence confirmed the looming conflict, suggesting the war would commence by 5 PM. Consequently, on the morning of Yom Kippur, the Israeli government initiated an urgent reserve mobilization. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) proposed a preemptive strike against the Egyptian and Syrian air forces, but Prime Minister Golda Meir vetoed this proposal, citing concerns about jeopardizing American support.

The conflict erupted at 2 PM when an artillery salvo of 4,000 shells targeted Israeli positions along the Bar-Lev Line at the Suez Canal. Once the bombardment ceased, Egyptian Commando units made their move, landing both along the Canal and deeper into the Sinai. These units were quickly followed by troops who crossed the Canal in small boats. The Egyptians succeeded in seizing a majority of the Israeli posts on the Canal's eastern flank. Most of the Egyptian advance took place between the forts. Israel’s plan had called for the 90 tanks that were in Sinai to be the second line of defense that would come to the aid of the forts and stop an Egyptian attack. Subsequent Israeli counterattacks were thwarted by the Egyptians, who employed anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. However, the gravest threat to Israel emerged on the Syrian front. A breakthrough at the Golan Heights meant Syrian forces could potentially reach the Galilee within a day, which the Syrians anticipated achieving in 24 hours.

The disparity in forces was stark. On the morning of October 6, the Syrians had a massive advantage: 1,400 tanks to Israel's 177, 115 artillery batteries against Israel's 11, and 40,000 infantry compared to Israel's 200. Against these overwhelming odds, the Israeli defense at Golan lasted a harrowing 24 hours, during which they repelled the Syrians. Though outnumbered, Israeli tankers fired more than twice as fast as their Syrian opponents and successfully hit Syrian tanks at greater distances. Nevertheless, the cost was high, with substantial territories in the Southern Golan being lost and many Israeli soldiers giving their lives to stop the Syrians. By Sunday night, the first Israeli reserve tank division began arriving, staving off further advances and eventually turning the tide against the Syrians.

Into Syria
As of October 10, 1973, the IDF had successfully recaptured the Golan Heights. Faced with determining their next course of action, the Army and the political echelon considered two main options. One option was to stop at the so-called purple line, which offered defensible positions, and deploy 200 tanks to fight in the Sinai. The alternative option was to capitalize on their momentum to seize Syrian territory on the road to Damascus, an area thought to be largely open. It was a strategic decision which fell to the cabinet. The prevailing view in the cabinet was that if events did not change in Sinai, Egypt would retain control of some territories. Furthermore, the Army stated that relocating the tanks to Sinai would require at least four days. Ultimately, Golda Meir decided that they should press into Syria as soon as possible, ensuring that if the war was to suddenly end, Israel would still control some Arab territory.

The attack began the next day on October 11th. At 11 AM, two columns were deployed: the first, under the command of Rafael (“Raful”) Eitan, attacked from the north; while the second, commanded by Dan Laner, would try to advance directly up the Kunitra-Damascus road. Although the direct assault on the Damascus road encountered challenges, the northern force made significant progress. As they began to approach the Knaker, the last fortification before the outskirts of Damascus, they unexpectedly encountered a large contingent of Iraqi tanks. The Israeli forces engaged the Iraqis, which proved to be inferior in combat, allowing the Israeli tanks to destroy dozens of Iraqi tanks without suffering any losses. However, the situation changed with the arrival of fresh Iraqi forces, totaling 500 tanks, 700 APCs, and 30,000 troops. With Israeli troops 20 miles from Damascus and after Israeli artillery fired some rounds at Mazeh airport outside Damascus, the Soviets threatened to intervene. This led to the decision to halt further advances on the Syrian front and focus on the Sinai.

The Largest Tank Battle, since The Battle of Kursk (WWII)
After Israel’s failed October 8th counter-offensive in Sinai, military strategists were left pondering their next move. The Egyptians were consolidating their hold on the East Bank of the Canal, where only the Budapest fortress was able to hold out. Israel possessed a copy of the Egyptian battle plan, which outlined an armored assault after the immediate crossing to recapture the key passes in Sinai. The Israeli Army devised plans for a crossing but hoped that the Egyptians would initiate an attack, thus avoiding the need for Israel to make the first move. Finally, on October 12th, 1973, the IDF received the first signs that elements of two armored divisions were detected crossing the canal, gearing up for the next stage of the battle.

On Sunday morning, October 14th, the second-largest tank battle in history began. Nearly 2,000 tanks became locked in fierce battle, as the Egyptians tried to break out of the bridgehead on the eastern side of the canal, with the Israelis strategically positioned in anticipation. Holding the high ground, the Israeli tanks turned the battle into devastating defeat for the Egyptians. The day turned into a slaughter. Israeli tanks destroyed 264 Egyptian tanks. Furthermore, as some Egyptian tanks advanced beyond the coverage of the SAM anti-aircraft umbrella, Egyptian tanks were quickly decimated by the IAF. Israel sustained minimal losses, with only six tanks destroyed.

General Haim Bar Lev ended the day by reporting to Prime Minister Golda Meir. Bar Lev stated: “It’s been a good day. Our forces are themselves again, and so are the Egyptians.”

 

The Battle of the Chinese Farm and the Crossing of the Canal
After the failed Egyptian offensive, the Israeli government gave the IDF approval to launch a major counteroffensive that included crossing the Suez Canal. The plan was to cross the canal at Deversoir, just north of the Great Bitter Lake, and to screen the crossing from attacks from the south. General Ariel Sharon’s forces led the attack, which they launched at 5 o'clock on October 15th. The maneuver began with a feint in the northern section of the line to draw the Egyptian forces to that area. Meanwhile, once the force reached the Bitter Lakes and moved north to the crossing point, they began crossing the canal on rafts, including floats for several tanks and other armored vehicles.

The goal was to expand the area leading to the beachhead to allow the unimpeded transport of bridging equipment and additional forces. However, after the initial Israeli forces had crossed, the Egyptians responded and closed the road behind them, effectively stranding the beachhead. This led to one of the most bitter fights of the war, commonly known as “The Chinese Farm” (in reality, a Japanese farm).

The Battle of the Chinese Farm, which began on the night of October 15th, 1973, lasted two days. The paratroopers tasked with gaining control of the area faced stiff resistance from the entrenched Egyptian 16th Infantry Brigade, who had fortified positions with anti-tank weapons, artillery, and machine guns. The dense agricultural fields and irrigation ditches provided the Egyptians with natural defensive advantages, complicating the Israeli advance.

As the Israelis attempted to push through the farm, the Egyptians launched several counterattacks, leading to intense close-quarters combat. The battle saw significant use of tanks and infantry fighting in confined spaces. The Egyptian forces utilized RPGs and Sagger anti-tank missiles effectively, inflicting considerable losses on Israeli armor.

Recognizing the battle's importance, both Israelis and Egyptians committed additional forces. The IDF brought in elements of the 162nd Armored Division, while the Egyptians reinforced their positions with additional infantry and armored units. The escalation turned the Chinese Farm into one of the most brutal and sustained engagements of the war.

By October 17th, Israeli forces finally gained control over the area. This allowed them to deploy the bridging equipment necessary to construct a bridge across the canal and reinforce the small Israeli force that had crossed the canal earlier.