US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was not satisfied with the ceasefire agreements and exchange of prisoners he had negotiated between Israel and Egypt. Rather, Kissinger had wanted to parlay the progress into a larger peace process. The first challenge was negotiating a further disengagement of forces between Israel and Egypt along the Suez Canal. In the meantime, Israeli and Egyptian generals were meeting daily at Kilometer 101 on the Suez-Cairo Highway to maintain the ceasefire. Kissinger moved the talks forward by making a new trip to the Middle East. He flew to the region on December 8, 1973, with the goal of convincing Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to attend a peace conference in Geneva. Kissinger was successful with all but the Syrians, who would not agree to attend, unless Israel promised to withdraw from the Golan Heights first—which was a nonstarter.

On December 22, 1973, the Foreign Ministers of all the above mentioned nations — with the exception of Syria, but with the addition of the Soviet Union — attended a meeting at Geneva’s Palais des Nations, under the nominal chairmanship of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. While there were no breakthroughs at this meeting, it was the first time since the Rhodes Conference, after the War of Independence, that Israeli and Arab negotiators met face-to-face in the same room.

At this juncture, the Israelis and Kissinger concluded that the best way forward would be through indirect negotiations between Israel and Egypt facilitated by Kissinger. This decision marked the beginning of what came to be known as Shuttle Diplomacy, as Kissinger began traveling between Israel and Egypt to broker an agreement. Kissinger’s success can partially be attributed to the two leaders who wanted peace. Sadat had sent Golda Meir a private letter which stated:

You must take my word seriously. When I made my initiative in 1971, I meant it. When I threatened war, I meant it. When I talk peace now, I mean it. We never had contact before. We now have the services of Dr Kissinger. Let us use him and talk to each other through him.

Kissinger was able to get both sides to agree to the following — Israel would withdraw from the West Bank of the Suez Canal and would move 5-7 kilometers inland. Egypt, however, would only be allowed to maintain 7,000 troops and 30 tanks on the East side of the Canal.

When Kissinger had brokered an agreement in principle between both sides, Golda Meir said the following:

Mr. Secretary, I think that not only those of us who are here take cognizance of this day as a great date. I am hopeful that it is the beginning, and in its wake will come the day when there will be peace in the Middle East, peace for Israel and its neighbors. I hope that this is the beginning of a process that will lead to permanent peace between Egypt and Israel.

I don't think it will make news if I would say that you, Mr. Secretary, had something to do with it. We don't like to use words which may sound like only words. But I sincerely and honestly believe that you have made history this week. I know you didn't begin it this week but there's no doubt in my mind. I want to tell you, on behalf of the people of Israel, how much we appreciate it.

I want to tell the President of the United States that his policy of understanding the problems in the Middle East, including the problems of Israel and its neighbors, has certainly led to this day. Israel and its people remember our appreciation of what he has done, of his attitude and his efforts.

There will be many, many mothers and young wives and children in Israel in the next few days, when they will see their dear ones, who for many months have been on the front watching over the security and safety of Israel and they will be very happy. We hope to see the day, and I honestly and sincerely believe, the day when armies will become something of the past.

And I want to express my thanks for your patience. Wisdom is something either given to one or not; you're either born with it or not, and for that you deserve no special credit. But for your patience, your work, your patience with both sides. We were easy [laughter] but maybe you had problems with the other side

During Kissinger’s final visit in this series of talks, Golda Meir entrusted him with a private letter for Sadat, which read:

I am deeply conscious of the significance of a message received by the Prime Minister of Israel from the President of Egypt. It is indeed a source of great satisfaction to me and I sincerely hope that these contacts between us through Dr. Kissinger will continue, and prove to be an important turning point in our relations.

I, for my part, will do my best to establish trust and understanding between us. Both our peoples need and deserve peace. It is my strongest conviction that peace is the goal toward which we must direct all our energies.

Let me reiterate what you said in your message: "When I talk of permanent peace, between us, I mean it." It is indeed extremely fortunate that we have Dr. Kissinger whom we both trust and who is prepared to give of his wisdom and talents in the cause of peace. I know that he will continue to extend this untiring service to the promotion of our common interest.

After reading Golda’s letter, Sadat was told by an aid that a few minutes before, at 12 noon on January 18, 1974, the disengagement agreement was signed by Israeli and Egyptian Generals and Kilometer 101. Sadat turned to Kissinger and said he would remove his military uniform and henceforth only wear it for ceremonial occasions.